Course Information
FacultyEconomic and Political Sciences
Cycle / Level1st / Undergraduate
Teaching PeriodSpring
CoordinatorPanagiotis Fousekis
Course ID100001502

Programme of Study: UPS School of Economics (2013-today)

Registered students: 0
OrientationAttendance TypeSemesterYearECTS
OIKONOMIASElective Course belonging to the selected specialization (Elective Specialization Course)633

Class Information
Academic Year2014 – 2015
Class PeriodSpring
Faculty Instructors
Weekly Hours3
Class ID
Course Type 2016-2020
  • Scientific Area
Course Type 2011-2015
Specific Foundation / Core
Mode of Delivery
  • Face to face
Language of Instruction
  • Greek (Instruction, Examination)
General Prerequisites
There are no prerequisites.
Learning Outcomes
Upon successful completion of this course, students will have acquired: - The ability to transfer strategic interaction situations from the field of the economy (and not only) to the analytical framework of Game Theory (construction of strategies and payoffs) - The ability to calculate equilibrium strategies in various games. - Familiarity with economic experiments and their design as a tool of economic behavioral research.
General Competences
  • Make decisions
  • Work in teams
  • Work in an interdisciplinary team
  • Advance free, creative and causative thinking
Course Content (Syllabus)
Strategic games, Nash equilibrium, best responses, dominant strategies Equilibria in games: oligopoly, electoral competition, war of attrition, auctions, law of accidents. Mixed strategies, beliefs. Extensive games with perfect information - Theory. Applications: The ultimatum game, the robbery game, agenda control, Stackelberg, vote buying, technological race Introduction to Experimental Economics Experiments in the classroom and presentations of assignments
Game Theory, Strategy
Educational Material Types
  • Notes
  • Slide presentations
  • Book
Use of Information and Communication Technologies
Use of ICT
  • Use of ICT in Course Teaching
  • Use of ICT in Communication with Students
Upload of course material on a weekly basis on the elearning platform (moodle)
Course Organization
Student Assessment
A. Written examination at the end of the semester (100%) or B. Written examination at the end of the semester (50%) and participation in teamwork (50%) Furthermore a bonus of 1 unit to those who attend at least 12 lectures (applies to A. And B).
Student Assessment methods
  • Written Assignment (Summative)
  • Performance / Staging (Summative)
  • Written Exam with Problem Solving (Summative)
Course Bibliography (Eudoxus)
Μ. Osborne, Εισαγωγή στη Θεωρία Παιγνίων, εκδ. Κλειδάριθμος, Αθήνα 2010. Κωδικός Βιβλίου στον ΕΥΔΟΞΟ: 35241. R. Gibbons, Εισαγωγή στη Θεωρία Παιγνίων, εκδ. Γ. & Κ. Δαρδανός, Αθήνα 2009.Κωδικός Βιβλίου στον ΕΥΔΟΞΟ: 31325.
Additional bibliography for study
Βαρουφάκης, Γιάνης (2007) Θεωρία παιγνίων : Η θεωρία που φιλοδοξεί να ενοποιήσει τις κοινωνικές επιστήμες, Αθήνα : Gutenberg Μηλολιδάκης, Κωστής (2009) Θεωρία παιγνίων : Μαθηματικά μοντέλα σύγκρουσης και συνεργασίας, Θεσσαλονίκη : σοφία A.E. Μαγείρου, Ευάγγελος Φ. (2012) Παίγνια και αποφάσεις : Μια εισαγωγική προσέγγιση, Αθήνα : Κριτική. Φουσέκης Παναγιώτης (2009), Στοιχεία Θεωρίας Παιγνίων , Πανεπιστημιακές Παραδόσεις, Τμήμα Εκδόσεων ΑΠΘ. Binmore, Ken (1991), Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. D. C. Heath, Lexington, MA. Dixit, Avinash K., and Nalebuff, Barry J. (1991), Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. Norton, New York. Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991), Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Gibbons, Robert (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Myerson, Roger B. (1991), Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Martin J. Osborne Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory. Martin J. Osborne Ariel Rubinstein (1990), Bargaining and Markets Rasmusen, Eric (2001), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd ed. Blackwell, Oxford.
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