HISTORY OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

Specific Foundation / Core

The course is also offered to exchange programme students.

The course gives students the opportunity to capture how the contemporary theory of legal reasoning has been historically formed, as well as its variety of currents of thought. This approach seems promising to open up a scope over fundamental questions of modern legal reasoning. By the end of the course, students will have shaped a clear vision as to how jurists ought to justify their judgements. Moreover, it is hoped that they will have adequately understood that foundational matters of legal science are essentially philosophical. In other words, the righteousness of legal judgements proves to be interwoven with the question: under which conditions might a legal order be legitimate and thus susceptible to obedience by the citizens in a democratic polity?

The course suggests mainly a historical overview on the formation of modern legal thinking, from French Revolution to our own era. This overview fosters on the question of what Law is and how it should be interpreted. The course is divided in two parts. The first part has a historical orientation. It examines a) the transition from the rational legal philosophy of the Enlightenment toward the legal positivism in 19th century; b) the contestation of legal positivism by newer currents of legal thought, from the end of 19th century and onwards; c) the appearance of innovative theories on legal reasoning after the II. World War. The second part tries to fertilize the aforementioned rich constellation of ideas, aiming to offer a reconstructive approach on contamporafy legal reasoning. DIAGRAM OF LECTURES 1) Kant’s legal philosophy, as the most representative model within the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. 2) The gradual appearance of legal positivism during the 19th century; its basic features and undercurrents. 3) Currents of thought critical to legal positivism: a) objective and teleological theory of interpretation, b) theory of legal interests, c) free interpretation of law. 4) The analytical theory of law in the after-War Britain. The interpretive model of R. Dworkin’s legal theory in the USA. 5) “Hermeneutic” theory of law, the “topic” legal theory and “New Rhetoric”. 6) The language of law after L. Wittgenstein’s “pragmatic” turn in the philosophy of language. 7) The legal syllogism in the framework of contemporary theory of legal argumentation. 8) Guidelines of a normative theory of legal reasoning and a critique against the decisionist model of legal interpretation (especially H. Kelsen’s). 9) Conditions of possibility for right answers to legal matters. 10) The possibility of critical assessment of Constitution. 11) From legal theory to philosophy of justice. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOME The course gives students the opportunity to capture how the contemporary theory of legal reasoning has been historically formed, as well as its variety of currents of thought. This approach seems promising to open up a scope over fundamental questions of modern legal reasoning. By the end of the course, students will have shaped a clear vision as to how jurists ought to justify their judgements. Moreover, it is hoped that they will have understood that foundational matters of legal science are essentially philosophical. In other words, the righteousness of legal judgements proves to be interwoven with the question: under which conditions might a legal order be legitimate and thus susceptible to obedience by the citizens? ELEMENTS OF BIBLIOGRAPHY Constantin Stamatis, Argumenter en droit. Une théorie critique de l’argumentation juridique, éd. Publisud, Paris, 1995. ----, «La possibilité de critique de la Constitution en tant que source suprême du droit», in: Le droit entre autonomie et ouverture. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Louis Bergel, éd. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2013, pp. 477-499. Le profil de la méthodologie contemporaine du droit remonte his-toriquement à la pensée juridique formée en Europe, surtout à la suite de la dynamique dégagée par la revolution française. Or, il nous faudra revenir en arrière pour en retracer les origines dans la pensée juridique du 19e siè-cle, dominée par ce courant immense, et à l’époque écrasant, que fut le juspositivisme. Vers la fin du 19e siècle, pourtant, pensée et méthodologie positivistes ont subi le feu d’une critique de plus en plus pénétrante. Avec un certain émerveillement pour les sciences sociales naissantes à l’époque, un en-semble de courants anti-formalistes a fait irruption sur la scène de la sci-ence européenne du droit. Au long du 20e siècle, sa force revivifiante a pu infuencer profondément le paysage méthodologique en ce qui concerne la justification des jugements juridiques. PLAN DES CONFERENCES 1) Philosophie de droit chez Kant. 2) La formation du positivisme juridique au 19e siècle: traits et courants principaux du juspositivisme. 3) Courants de pensée anti-formaliste au début du 20e siècle: a) la théorie d’intrerprétation objective et téléologique, b) la jurisprudence des in-térêts, c) le mouvement du droit libre. 4) La théorie analytique du droit en Grande Bretagne. Le modèle herméneutique de R. Dworkin aux Etats-Unis. 5) Théorie herméneutique du droit, la Topique et la Nouvelle Rhétorique après la guerre. 6) Le langage du droit à la suite de L. Wittgenstein. 7) Le syllogisme juridique selon la théorie contemporaire d’argumentation juridique 8) Pour une théorie normative, non décisioniste, de l’intrerprétation ju-ridique (contre les vues de H. Kelsen et M. Troper). 9) La justesse des jugements juridiques; à la recherche d’un critère ra-tionnel. 10) La possibilité de critique rationnelle de la Constitution. 11) De la théorie du droit vers la philosophie de la justice. TEXTES D’APPUI Constantin Stamatis, Argumenter en droit. Une théorie critique de l’argumentation juridique, éd. Publisud, Paris, 1995 (les quatre premiers chapitres). ----, «La possibilité de critique de la Constitution en tant que source su-prême du droit», in: Le droit entre autonomie et ouverture. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Louis Bergel, éd. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2013, pp. 477-499. ----, «La systématicité du droit chez Kelsen et les apories de la norme fondamentale», Archives de philosophie du droit, tome 31, 1986, pp. 45-55.

Law, Enlightenment, Kant, Legal Positivism, Contemporary currents of legal thought, Legal Reasoning, Theory of Justice.

25-11-2015